[The] problems started way back when the Brexiteers behind the official Vote Leave campaign very deliberately decided that they should not put forward any specific plan for how this might be achieved. Their view was that, if any such strategy was proposed, this would only set off ferocious arguments with all those lobbying for alternative plans.
This was evident in a sneery e-mail which Dominic Cummings sent me in July 2015 in response to one of mine when I had argued that the official “no” campaign would need an exit plan.
Cummings by then was already aware of Flexcit, acknowledging that it was “unarguable” that it was “a very important document”, but we went on to say that he had to deal with “a physical reality” where “almost nobody agrees … about almost anything”.
Thus, it was not a question of the campaign failing to have a plan. The idea was deliberately rejected, an act of cowardice that had the main players ducking an issue that was inevitably going to rebound on us all, simply because the campaign wanted to avoid disagreement in its ranks.
The inevitable result of this act of cowardice – only offering voters a blank cheque as to what might happen next – was that it merely postponed the moment when precisely those arguments were bound to emerge. After the result, each of the rival groups could then claim that the referendum result supported whatever agenda they were putting forward.
h/t Adrian: “As I have said from the day of the referendum result any one that thought the elites would acquiesce to the will of the people was sadly mistaken. Its almost as if it was by design.”
