WaPo comes right out and says it;
it’s looking more and more as though those in and outside of Congress who last month were assailing Gen. Petraeus’s credibility and insisting that there was no letup in Iraq’s bloodshed were — to put it simply — wrong.
gawd that must hurt their guts to have to report the truth.
More from WaPo:
“Al-Qaeda In Iraq Reported Crippled
Many Officials, However, Warn Of Its Resilience”
Mark
Ottawa
But, being all things WaPo about the article…“The trend could change quickly and tragically, of course….and….“This doesn’t necessarily mean the war is being won”….the gratuitous doom qualifiers that any peabrain could reason without them are added twice.
This turn of events could bring the rabid lefty self-loathing and America-haters out of their closets rooting for the new underdogs soon.
This will be bad news for MoveOn.org.
“This will be bad news for MoveOn.org.
Posted by: set you free at October 15, 2007 4:50 PM ”
Ya . . probably cost Soros a few extra million to buy them more support.
“The trend could change quickly and tragically, of course”
For example, when the democrats decide to needlessly antagonize the Turks, causing them to interfere with supply lines and launch military action. Guess the dems must have seen this success and realized they had to undercut it with whatever means they had.
I have no problem setting the record straight regarding the Armenians, but it was pathetic for the democrats to discover this cause now.
Saw this reported on MSNBC this morning. Can’t remember the nut-root reporters name but after giving the WAPO story, he then declared this as bad news for the Bush Administration. Said Bush had plans for a long term commitment of troops in Iraq and that if the situtation were to stabilize then Bush would have to pull out troops much sooner than he wanted to. These people are unbelievable. Gotta spin it so it’s bad news even if you have to make a fool out of yourself doing it.
Yup. This is way to premature. If our leftist peaceniks, appeasniks and misc. turd burglars have their way…there may still be the opportunity for them to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
Perhaps these idiots wouldn’t have such problems identifying the moral high ground if they didn’t live right on top of it.
Pustules.
Support the troops everyone, even with this good news, now is not a time to slack off!
this kind of information does not fit the hidden agenda of CBCpravda, so it is a lie by omission.
Yes, there is the we must lose by definition crowd, because for them use of military force is never an option. When it is,though, sometimes you make mistakes; Iraq IMHO was one of them. US must prevail now or this thing will move way beyond voter brownie points. It’s heartening to hear that AQ is weakening, having chosen Iraq as their new caliphate. AQ can never beat us; but they can get us to beat ourselves by provoking a major war. That is why they cannot be allowed to prevailin Iraq.
We can debate the merits of invasion all we want; it’s no longer relevant to the situation – unless finger pointing and sneering is our modus operandi, or unless someone’s trying to win the Oval office (whomever that is). The Layton and Dion US equivalents are still under lock and key and not allowed to effect something really stupid; for now, that is.
While I may believe that Iraq will never be contained or controlled by American troops, and that their presence there will end in a shameful exit not unlike the Vietnam debacle, I would be remiss to say that being wrong would upset me. I would be absolutely, unequivocally delighted to be as wrong as could be about this. If the Americans somehow turned around the largest losing effort in the history of modern warfare, I would personally commend them for it and for the vision against all odds.
But I’m almost certain it’s not going to happen.
1. This is an editorial.
2. Their “facts” suck. Look at the icasualities website they cite, choose iraq, filter by civilians. They compared this years best month to last years worst.
3. The USA Today is reporting that the Iraqi Health Ministry (also cited) has been ordered to stop counting civilian casualties.
1+2+3 = There’s no slam dunk here folks. I sure as hell hope the “surge” does work, but nothing I’ve read in this editorial or in the sources it cites comes close to making people who claim the surge isn’t working, “wrong”.
It was Ramadan you idiots! Every year there is a plunge in middle east deaths during Ramada. In the same way that on the Western Front in WW1 and WW2, the fighting was LESS intense as both sides acknowledged their ‘religious’ holiday. Muslims do the same. Sheeeeeeesh …. anything to try and justify the murderous nonsense that is going on in Iraq!
A McGuinty supporter writes: “the largest losing effort in the history of modern warfare…”
I’d dispute that point, except I can tell by your Special Flowery Language so typical of the Canadian male that it would descend into a relativist hell of defining “largest” and “losing” and “effort” and etc. etc….
Oh, and thanks for supporting McGuinty. I appreciate the imminent 2% sales tax hike on my purchases. Thanks.
This is a big deal. The WaPo realizes that it better change it’s opinion fast – in order to stay pseudo-relevant.
I’ve also noticed that when you google news on Iraq you see very little about casualties – which was the complete opposite a couple of months ago. The fact that AQI cannot mount their usual yearly Ramadan mayhem is also very telling about the state of AQI right now.
A perspective from some captains on the ground…
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/15/AR2007101500841.html)
The Real Iraq We Knew
By 12 former Army captains
Tuesday, October 16, 2007; 12:00 AM
Today marks five years since the authorization of military force in Iraq, setting Operation Iraqi Freedom in motion. Five years on, the Iraq war is as undermanned and under-resourced as it was from the start. And, five years on, Iraq is in shambles.
As Army captains who served in Baghdad and beyond, we’ve seen the corruption and the sectarian division. We understand what it’s like to be stretched too thin. And we know when it’s time to get out.
What does Iraq look like on the ground? It’s certainly far from being a modern, self-sustaining country. Many roads, bridges, schools and hospitals are in deplorable condition. Fewer people have access to drinking water or sewage systems than before the war. And Baghdad is averaging less than eight hours of electricity a day.
Iraq’s institutional infrastructure, too, is sorely wanting. Even if the Iraqis wanted to work together and accept the national identity foisted upon them in 1920s, the ministries do not have enough trained administrators or technicians to coordinate themselves. At the local level, most communities are still controlled by the same autocratic sheiks that ruled under Saddam. There is no reliable postal system. No effective banking system. No registration system to monitor the population and its needs.
The inability to govern is exacerbated at all levels by widespread corruption. Transparency International ranks Iraq as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. And, indeed, many of us witnessed the exploitation of U.S. tax dollars by Iraqi officials and military officers. Sabotage and graft have had a particularly deleterious impact on Iraq’s oil industry, which still fails to produce the revenue that Pentagon war planners hoped would pay for Iraq’s reconstruction. Yet holding people accountable has proved difficult. The first commissioner of a panel charged with preventing and investigating corruption resigned last month, citing pressure from the government and threats on his life.
Against this backdrop, the U.S. military has been trying in vain to hold the country together. Even with “the surge,” we simply do not have enough soldiers and marines to meet the professed goals of clearing areas from insurgent control, holding them securely and building sustainable institutions. Though temporary reinforcing operations in places like Fallujah, An Najaf, Tal Afar, and now Baghdad may brief well on PowerPoint presentations, in practice they just push insurgents to another spot on the map and often strengthen the insurgents’ cause by harassing locals to a point of swayed allegiances. Millions of Iraqis correctly recognize these actions for what they are and vote with their feet — moving within Iraq or leaving the country entirely. Still, our colonels and generals keep holding on to flawed concepts.
U.S. forces, responsible for too many objectives and too much “battle space,” are vulnerable targets. The sad inevitability of a protracted draw-down is further escalation of attacks — on U.S. troops, civilian leaders and advisory teams. They would also no doubt get caught in the crossfire of the imminent Iraqi civil war.
Iraqi security forces would not be able to salvage the situation. Even if all the Iraqi military and police were properly trained, equipped and truly committed, their 346,000 personnel would be too few. As it is, Iraqi soldiers quit at will. The police are effectively controlled by militias. And, again, corruption is debilitating. U.S. tax dollars enrich self-serving generals and support the very elements that will battle each other after we’re gone.
This is Operation Iraqi Freedom and the reality we experienced. This is what we tried to communicate up the chain of command. This is either what did not get passed on to our civilian leadership or what our civilian leaders chose to ignore. While our generals pursue a strategy dependent on peace breaking out, the Iraqis prepare for their war — and our servicemen and women, and their families, continue to suffer.
There is one way we might be able to succeed in Iraq. To continue an operation of this intensity and duration, we would have to abandon our volunteer military for compulsory service. Short of that, our best option is to leave Iraq immediately. A scaled withdrawal will not prevent a civil war, and it will spend more blood and treasure on a losing proposition.
America, it has been five years. It’s time to make a choice.
This column was written by 12 former Army captains: Jason Blindauer served in Babil and Baghdad in 2003 and 2005. Elizabeth Bostwick served in Salah Ad Din and An Najaf in 2004. Jeffrey Bouldin served in Al Anbar, Baghdad and Ninevah in 2006. Jason Bugajski served in Diyala in 2004. Anton Kemps served in Babil and Baghdad in 2003 and 2005. Kristy (Luken) McCormick served in Ninevah in 2003. Luis Carlos Montalván served in Anbar, Baghdad and Nineveh in 2003 and 2005. William Murphy served in Babil and Baghdad in 2003 and 2005. Josh Rizzo served in Baghdad in 2006. William “Jamie” Ruehl served in Nineveh in 2004. Gregg Tharp served in Babil and Baghdad in 2003 and 2005. Gary Williams served in Baghdad in 2003.
Perry,
We need to see comments from the soldiers that are there right now.
A choice has been made – the US has decided to win this war and turn Iraq into a free country – shutdown Islamism – and protect America.
test
Interesting, Perry. The most recent service any of those officers had in Iraq is in 2006, long before the surge, which itself was long overdue. How about quoting something from the past two or three months.
“A choice has been made – the US has decided to win this war and turn Iraq into a free country – shutdown Islamism – and protect America.”
Every western power that has occupied the Middle East including Napoleon does so claiming that it’s a benevolent act with the best intentions. Doubtless these intentions are believed at the time by many but in hindsight they all look ridiculous.
The Iraq War can be called many things but the United States isn’t spending hundreds of billions of dollars on its occupation for humanitarian reasons.
“A choice has been made – the US has decided to win this war and turn Iraq into a free country – shutdown Islamism – and protect America.”
Every western power that has occupied the Middle East including Napoleon does so claiming that it’s a benevolent act with the best intentions. Doubtless these intentions are believed at the time by many but in hindsight they all look ridiculous.
The Iraq War can be called many things but the United States isn’t spending hundreds of billions of dollars on its occupation for humanitarian reasons. Pretending otherwise is an absurd fantasy that nobody really believes.
Raphael,
Actually, the war part was an overwhelming success. It’s the colonial policing (in Steyn’s terms) that has been the disaster.
The Americans are the best in the world at crushing an opposing army and smashing regimes they go to war with.
They suck at nation building. Mostly because they’re not ruthless enough and care too much about procedure and rights. You don’t pacify the “angry natives” (in former British-colonial terms) by being soft and nice. You pacify the angry natives by crushing dissent and eliminating their will to resist. To do so takes the kind of action that is unacceptable to free democracies.
That’s the problem. If you’re gonna do what is necessary, you may as well not bother as you’d be creating the problem you went to war to defeat: tyranny.
The lesson to be learned is that if you have a problem with a country (Iran say,) drop bombs on that problem but don’t invade with boots on the ground. Smash the enemy’s ability to continue to make nuisance of themselves without taking ownership of their country.
Leftdog,
As usual you get it exactly backwards. Every Ramadan sees and increase in attacks.
What you fail to realize is that Muslims celebrate their religious times by stepping up their jihads and killing more infidels. That includes tribal Sunni/Shiite rivalries.
Louise,
You wanted to hear from soldiers on the ground within the last few months? Here are some comments from soldiers on the ground, published in the NY Times on August 19, 2007
(http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/opinion/19jayamaha.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1&oref=slogin)
As you may recall, two of these servicemen have since been killed, as stated here: http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1003638726.
Is that current enough for you?
OP-ED CONTRIBUTORS
The War as We Saw It
By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA, EDWARD SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY and JEREMY A. MURPHY
Baghdad
VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)
The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the “battle space” remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers’ expense.
A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.
As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias.
Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.
However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.
In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a “time-sensitive target acquisition mission” on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse — namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.
Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.
Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux.
The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members. The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling against the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us something useful for the moment.
Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation risks losing it all. Washington’s insistence that the Iraqis correct the three gravest mistakes we made — de-Baathification, the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of government — places us at cross purposes with the government we have committed to support.
Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict — as we do now — will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run.
At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone services and sanitation. “Lucky” Iraqis live in gated communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider normal.
In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with deep resignation, “We need security, not free food.”
In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and force our withdrawal.
Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.
We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through.
Buddhika Jayamaha is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant. Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier is a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff sergeant.
“…published in the NY Times” – That’s all we need to read in order to predict the thrust of the article.
“They suck at nation building. Mostly because they’re not ruthless enough and care too much about procedure and rights.”
They did much better with guys like Pinochet and the Shah. The dictators work nicely while they last but unfortunately they don’t do. Eventually people want democracy and you’re back to square one with the pesky natives calling the shots.
This lies at the heart of America’s conundrum in Iraq. How do you get a democracy to do what you tell it to when a good chunk of it’s voters hate your guts.
“Oh, and thanks for supporting McGuinty. I appreciate the imminent 2% sales tax hike on my purchases. Thanks.”
You fool, I voted conservative and run a conservative blog. Think before you write, but more importantly, read before you write as well.
Bullshit!!