The Belmont Club is one of my regular reads. This analysis illustrates why so many people are turning their backs in disgust at the “mainstream media”. The two NYT reporters mentioned didn’t seem to know they were being used. That’s forgivable under the circumstances.
The bigger question – when reporters on the ground become an integral part of the enemy’s strategy, are the editors who approve the reports aware of what is being done? If they aren’t, are they incompetent – and if they are, is it complicity? Too storng a charge? I don’t think so.
Judging by the frequency that the media outlets places negative headlines over content that is tilted towards the positive for the Bush administration – my suspicion is that the more likely answer is the second.
In hindsight, it was possible that CENTCOM arranged for its troop “rotations” in Iraq with the end in view of increasing the available forces under the cover of regular replacement. When the Blackwater contractors were murdered in Fallujah, an operation some speculated was organized by Syrian Special Operations, US commanders probably saw it for the signal that it was. They had arranged media coverage of the outrage for a reason. It was followed by Shi’ite attacks on coalition bases, one attack per ally and a wave of kidnappings. Then Moqtada al-Sadr conveniently seized one of the holiest sites in Shi’ite Islam, the Golden Mosque and proclaimed he was going to die there. Two New York Times staffers were kidnapped and conveniently held in the Golden Mosque, an incident described in Belmont Club’s The Time Traveller. There, they were allowed to glimpse preparations for the final stand. The script written for CENTCOM to follow was probably this (what follows is speculation). Small Marine units would rush into Fallujah to recover the Blackwater corpses and trapped themselves. The Marines would mount a desperate rescue which would create heavy civilian damage. In the meanwhile, Sadr would attack the coalition partner’s bases and flee to the Golden Mosque, where his presence would be confirmed by newsmen who just happend to be to imprisoned there and later released to tell the tale. CENTCOM would destroy the mosque from which he had ‘just left’ or perhaps only occupied by a double. Catastrophe would follow on catastrophe, necessitating the postponement of the June 30 transfer of power.
But CENTCOM refused to sing from the sheet. Sanchez lagged the Fallujah operation and then when the traps had staled, attacked on his own terms. With a keen awareness in the operational limitations of Sadr’s men, he let them strike their impotent blows, then picked them up piecemeal. Within 72 hours, CENTCOM had essentially deflected the Syrian/Iranian offensive and regained the initiative. In the coming days, it will be important to see whether Sadr and the Hizbullah lackeys can maintain their tempo. If they cannot, then the next moves are CENTCOM’s. It seems that Sadr rapidly went to Plan B, leaving the Golden Mosque for Najaf� without finding any takers at CENTCOM. He must be looking at Plan C. President Bush has been on the telephone with key coalition heads of state, bringing them up to speed on the current situation. Syria and Iran have dished out their best shot and landed it on CENTCOM’s arm. Now it’s our turn.
and further down the page:
The pitiful accounts of the battle of Fallujah should put paid to the silly press suggestions that the US military is “overwhelmed”. The problem is that the terrifying combat efficiency of the Marines may in fact lead to the literal extermination of enemy forces. US authorities, with a longer term end game in mind, are balancing the political outcomes of letting the Marines continue, even in their restrained mode, and taking more US casualties from holding back. When the media learns the full extent of enemy casualties in Fallujah, Kut, Ramadi, Saddam city and elsewhere, the image of the US military will be switched from “hapless” to “bullying” in a millisecond.
Hapless to bullying? Try “Tet” to “Guernica”.